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Abstract
We develop an anonymous trading framework where specialization and trade are beneficial to society and trading arrangements are endogenous. Its key features are that individual actions can
have long-lasting aggregate consequences and the current allocation of consumption can aﬀect the
future availability of productive resources. We study equilibrium patterns of exchange when the
trading sequences are finite and deterministic, demonstrating that fiat money does not necessarily
loose its beneficial allocative role. The reason is that individual actions that reduce the agent’s current payoﬀ–such as selling for money on its final trading date–can be incentive-compatible when
this prevents others from making choices carrying adverse long-lasting aggregate consequences.

JEL: C70, E40.
Keywords: Monetary Equilibrium, Anonymous Trade, Finite Horizons, Repeated Games,
Specialization.
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1 Introduction
A basic idea in economics is that allocations can be improved by specialization and trade
and can be further expanded by innovations in the trading technology. Fiat money is such
an innovation: several observers have noted how the use of ‘barren’ tokens facilitates beneficial trades in markets that are not well-functioning, especially if informational frictions
exist (e.g. Ostroy, 1973, Townsend, 1989, Ostroy and Starr, 1990). Indeed, Kocherlakota
(1998) suggests that money is simply a record-keeping technology; he demonstrates that
a monetary allocation dominates non-monetary outcomes in several settings where it is
impossible to commit to future actions or to freely access each others’ trade records.
Interestingly, virtually all fiat monetary models consider infinite trading sequences.
The reason is that for intrinsically useless tokens to have value in equilibrium, agents must
expect that someone will want to trade consumption for money at some future date (Cass
and Shell, 1980). One may thus conclude that money necessarily looses its technological
edge in environments where the monetary trade sequence is finite and deterministic (e.g.
see Kocherlakota, p. 244). In this study we explain why this would be a rushed conclusion.
In so doing, we make two contributions.
First, we add to the monetary theory literature by demonstrating that fiat-money can
have a fundamental allocative role in economies characterized by finite trade sequences.
Prior work has studied existence of monetary equilibria in finite-horizon economies where
money has either an implicit role or the final trading date is uncertain (Faust, 1989, Kultti,
1995, Kovenock and De Vries, 2002).2 We complement this work by studying economies
where money has an explicit role and the trading horizon is publicly known.
More generally, we contribute to a literature concerned with allocative eﬃciency in
environments with limited commitment and enforcement (for a monetary economy, see
for example Corbae and Ritter, 2004). We provide a simple but intuitive example that
demonstrates why incentive-compatibility need neither hinge on the agents’ ability to
obtain current or future rewards, nor on the threat of future punishment. Precisely,
in environments where individual actions can significantly aﬀect some aggregate state
variable, an agent may voluntarily take an action that reduces his current payoﬀ if this
prevents others from behaving in ways that carry adverse aggregate consequences.
To articulate these ideas we construct an economy with finitely many dynastic (altru2

The continuous-time model of Faust has a terminal date but an infinite number of trade rounds.

The models of Kultti and Kovenock and De Vries share one or more of these features: (i) agents are
asymmetrically informed on either the last trading date or their position at that date (buyer or seller) or
(ii) money is a unit of account.
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istic) agents from two overlapping generations. The initial old have one token each, the
young are productive and society can benefit from specialization and trade. This simply
means that the young should produce a high-value good for the old, avoiding other alternatives. A key aspect is that the current allocation of consumption can aﬀect the future
availability of productive resources. Indeed, we add a reason to worry about consumption
of the old–relative to the usual (e.g. Antinolfi et al., 2001)–by letting a dynasty’s survival
depend on the old’s consumption. Finally, we make explicit a set of information frictions
that obstacle history-dependent credit trades and give money a central role. To do this,
we assume pairwise anonymous matches with limited communication/commitment, i.e.,
trades are unobservable to third parties and agents can choose autarky at any point in
time. Indeed, the dynastic formulation naturally motivates the existence of diﬃculties in
accessing trade histories–much as ‘lack-of-recall’ does in Temzelides and Yu (2004)–and
in making privately observed actions, public.
We relax the standard assumption of infinite trading sequence in two progressive steps.
First, we let tokens have a finite deterministic life-span and then we do the same for the
economy’s duration. We prove that multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria are possible, in
some of which trade takes place only if supported by the exchange of tokens. Especially,
equilibria with valued tokens exist both when they are perishable and the economy is
infinite or when the economy has a finite life-span. In the latter case monetary trade occurs
until a date suﬃciently ahead of the economy’s last period. Either way, the incentive to
swap consumption for money, on money’s last trading date, hinges on the desire to avoid
an inferior equilibrium in the remaining periods.
What is the intuition? The fundamental feature is that individual actions can be
strategically non-negligible and have permanent aggregate consequences. In the model,
lack of consumption by an old permanently reduces the productive resources available to
society and can spawn significant consumption risk in a small economy. Unfortunately,
the allocation of goods cannot be based on individual histories or identities. It is the need
to bridge this information gap that creates a role for money even if the trading horizon is
finite. To see why, suppose tokens are valued up to a date t ahead of the economy’s last
period. Making a unilateral transfer to someone who has a token in t is optimal if it is
the old who own money and if, by refusing to make this ‘gift,’ the agent would severely
impair his and his dynasty’s consumption prospects in the remaining periods.
2 Environment
We propose a conceptually simple model where the available productive resources depend
2

on past allocations of consumption, in order to bring to light the workings of an anonymous
trading framework where specialization and trade are beneficial to society. Along the way,
we will motivate its central features and its simplifying assumptions.
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, ..., J ≤ ∞. In t = 0 there are 2N ∈ N+ spatially separated

dynastic agents divided in equal proportion between young and old members of two-

period-lived overlapping generations. The agents are altruistic in that their objective
is the maximization of their dynasty’s lifetime utility from consumption of either of two
types of non-storable goods, denoted ‘market’ and ‘home’. The key diﬀerence from similar
models of dynastic agents (e.g. Fuster et al., 2003) is that consumption of some good is a
necessary input for the preservation of one’s dynasty. Specifically, an old agent generates
an oﬀspring only if he consumes; otherwise, the dynasty dies out.3 As in other overlapping
generations models, we make productive resources available only to the young so the size
of the new generation is a key aggregate state variable. These features capture–simply
and intuitively–the notion that current productive resources depend on past allocations.
Endowments are as follows. Each initial old has an indivisible unit of fiat money,
known to last until date 1 ≤ H ≤ ∞ included. Each young has a production opportunity

that can be used in one of two ways. He can use it to produce alone one indivisible
market good by supplying eﬀort that generates disutility e ∈ (0, βu). Here, u > 0 is the

period utility from consumption of a market good and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.

To motivate the need for trade, we assume that the young do not derive utility from
own market production (e.g. Diamond, 1982). The alternative use of the production
opportunity is as follows. The young can team-up with someone else–young or old–in
order to costlessly produce and then consume one home good. Each partner is assumed
to derive αu period utility from such team activity, with α ∈ (0, 12 ). Thus, although home

goods are least preferred, team activity allows agents to improve over autarky in the stage
game. Indeed, we set the agents free to choose autarky at every point in time.
At each date agents select independently and simultaneously either autarky–which
generates zero current utility–or anonymous trade. By this we mean that the agent
elects to match to someone else–whose identity and history cannot be observed–for the
purpose of trading. We assume that, although the initial population is known, the number
of traders cannot be directly observed. Traders’ interaction occurs according to a directed
3

Hence, the model can be interpreted as a simpler version of one in which either survival probabilities

or the discount factor depend explicitly on the allocation of consumption, approaches seen in the literature
of life-cycle consumption choices (e.g. Ray and Struefert, 1993, or Shi and Epstein, 1993). The inherent
simplicity of our formalization enhances the transparency of the analysis and of the model’s workings.
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matching process whose operation is detailed in the next section. Here, we simply note
that this process is essentially an assignment rule that exhausts all mutually desirable
pairings selecting traders at random. As is standard in many ‘deep’ models of money, we
assume that traders cannot communicate across matches, are anonymous and are unable
to enforce or commit to an action. Finally, we assume that paired agents can only observe
their respective actions and money holdings and that their exchange is based on a direct
trading mechanism that is taken as given.
In short, in this model trading arrangements are endogenous and the current allocation
of consumption aﬀects the future availability of productive resources. Money may have a
fundamental role since the owners of productive resources cannot access trade histories.
Indeed, the dynastic agents formulation naturally motivates such diﬃculties as well as the
existence of obstacles in making public privately observed actions. These features allow
us to make explicit a set of information frictions that obstacle credit-type trades.
3 Decentralized Symmetric Equilibria
Agents play a game of imperfect information that, at every date, has two stages. At
the beginning of each period, the agent must choose whether to trade and who to trade
with. Then, pairwise matches are formed among those who have selected to trade. In the
second stage, each matched agent proposes a trading plan that is implemented only if the
proposals are consistent. At each stage agents can select autarky.
Specifically, denote the agent’s state at the beginning of t by z(t) = (m, a) where
m = 0, 1 denotes money holdings and a = 0, 1 is the age, young or old. The agent must
choose whether and with whom to trade, taking as given the choices of others. He can
choose either autarky, denoted 0, or a trading position denoted τ = b, s, i.e., trade as a
buyer or seller (b or s). He also chooses whom to match with by selecting the partner’s
desired characteristics: money holdings m and trading position τ . We denote by ω z (t)
these beginning-of-period t choices of a representative agent, so
+
0
if autarky is selected
ω z (t) =
(τ , τ , m ) if trade is selected.
Say, if ω 1 (t) = (b, s, 0) then we have an agent with money (z = 1) who has chosen to
match as a buyer (τ = b) to a seller wihout money (τ = s and m = 0).
Given these choices, pairings take place in a manner that reflects the traders’ selections. This can be thought of as a directed matching process that–without going into
unnecessary details–has the following key characteristics. First, two traders can match
4

only if their choices ω are mutually consistent. Second, matching must be feasible, a notion formalized by assuming that the probability of the desired matching depends on the
number of buyers B and sellers S. In particular, if sellers want to match with buyers–and
viceversa–every trader is matched as desired only if B = S. If B = S, then the representative trader on the longest side of the market matches with someone with probability
min{S,B}
max{S,B}

and remains unmatched otherwise. Matched traders are anonymous.4

Unmatched traders do no nothing while paired agents interact via a direct trading
mechanism. Each trader can take a single action that may depend only on z, t and the
partner’s money holdings m . Assuming the action induces a single outcome, we can think
of traders as playing a coordination game simultaneously proposing a feasible transfer of
goods (home or market) and tokens, denoted xz (t, m ) = (h, g, d). Here d, g ∈ {−1, 0, 1}

and h ∈ {−1/2, 0, 1/2} denote the proposed transfer (−) or request (+) of d money, g

market and h home goods. Consistent proposals are implemented, else autarky results.
Actions and outcomes are unobserved by others and the match breaks at the period’s end.
We model limited commitment by requiring that the trading mechanism satisfies se-

quential rationality (see Kocherlakota, 1998). Without introducing additional notation,
this simply means that the agent’s strategy must be a mapping from all its possible information sets into actions and it specifies a weakly optimal action at each information
set, given that all others follow their strategies in the current and all future information
sets. In particular, we note that since an agent can always choose autarky in (or outside)
a match, for any action taken by anyone else, then it must be the case that equilibrium
actions be compatible with individual incentives.
In constructing an equilibrium we focus on symmetric strategies, checking only unilateral one-period deviations (the unimprovability principle allows us to do so), restricting
attention to environments where multiple deviations are not allowed (e.g. matched agents
cannot both deviate). To sum up, we adopt the following equilibrium concept
Definition. An equilibrium is a list of sequentially rational strategies {ω z (t), xz (t, m )}Jt=0 ,
that are identical for agents in an identical state.

In what follows, we will say that at date t there is monetary trade if sellers of market
goods require a token in exchange for their production, i.e. if d = 1. We start by studying
time-invariant trading regimes when H = J = ∞, providing a condition insuring that
4

Thus, it may be helpful to think of this as a directed search process with frictions as in, say, Burdett,

Shi and Wright (2001). For a rigorous discussion of anonymity in environments where agents are bilaterally
matched see Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello (2004).
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money has a fundamental role in sustaining the eﬃcient allocation. Then, we study
the case in which money ceases to exist after date H < J = ∞. Finally, we study a

finite horizon economy, J < ∞. In these two last cases we cannot consider time-invariant

allocations (since money has no intrinsic value ) and so we focus on equilibria with regimeswitching; there is some date T < J that separates two diﬀerent, time-invariant, trading
regimes.
Throughout the discussion, we retain the following assumption
u−e
−e + βu
> αu ≥
.
2
1+β

(1)

Simply put (see later) the first inequality implies that at each date market production and
trade is Pareto eﬃcient. The second inequality implies that a young agent would rather
avoid production of market goods and engage in home production, so that something must
be done to prevent him from doing so.
3.1 Allocations under infinite trading sequences
Suppose H = J = ∞. Here there can be a non-monetary stationary equilibrium and

also a monetary equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which, at every date, sellers of market
goods require a token in exchange for their production.
If money is expected to be valueless, market goods are not produced and home production is individually optimal. We call this a non-monetary pattern of exchange. Formally,
the equilibrium strategies are independent of money holdings. If, without loss in generality, we call the young a seller and the old a buyer, then for all m and m we have:
+
(b, s, m ) if z = (m, 1)
∗∗
ω z (t) = ω z =
(s, b, m ) if z = (m, 0)
xz (t, m ) = x∗∗
z =

+

(2)
(1/2, 0, 0)

if z = (m, 1)

(−1/2, 0, 0)

if z = (m, 0).

In short, at every date we have N young-old matches where the home good is produced
and consumed in equal amounts. Since agents care about their descendants, every agent
has stationary lifetime utility defined recursively by
vc = αu + βvc ⇒ vc =

αu
.
1−β

(3)

Now suppose agents believe money has value and old agents choose to buy market
goods in exchange for money. Suppose also that young agents choose to sell market goods
6

for money. Thus, in each period there are N buyer-seller pairs and each agent alternates
market production as young, to market consumption as old. We refer to this pattern of
exchange as monetary trade. Formally, in equilibrium we have
+
(b, s, 0) if z = (1, 1)
∗
ω z (t) = ω z =
(s, b, 1) if z = (0, 0)
xz (t, m ) = x∗z (m ) =

+

(4)
(0, 1, −1)

(0, −1, 1)

if z = (1, 1) and m = 0
if z = (0, 0) and m = 1.

In equilibrium, let vb be the stationary expected lifetime utility of an old buyer and
vs for a young seller. Trade generates u + βvs payoﬀ to a buyer and −e + βvb to a seller.

Defining vb and vs recursively we have

vb = u + βvs and vs = −e + βvb
so that
vb =

u − βe
βu − e
.
2 > vc ≥ vs =
1−β
1 − β2

(5)

The inequalities follow from (1), which is seen to imply u − βe > αu(1 + β). In short,

monetary exchange is a deterministic trading cycle that–relative to home production–
generates higher lifetime utility for the buyer and greater surplus in the match.
Lemma 1. Let H = J = ∞. The strategies defined in (2) and (4) can both be an

equilibrium. However, only (4) sustains the Pareto eﬃcient outcome.

Proof. Conjecture that either (2) or (4) is an equilibrium strategy. In either case autarky
is suboptimal, since trade generates non-negative surplus.
Suppose that (2) is an equilibrium strategy, i.e., money has no value. Clearly, the
actions specified in (2) are individually optimal. The alternative is earning zero payoﬀ,
for an old agent, and less than αu + βvc , for a young agent.
Suppose that (4) is an equilibrium strategy, i.e., money has value. Here, an old agent
strictly prefers oﬀering his money to a seller of a market good. In equilibrium a young
agent optimally chooses to sell a market good for money. Indeed, given the equilibrium
matching strategies, a young can only match to a buyer with money and an old cannot
consume if he is without money. Thus, the actions specified in (4) are individually optimal.
Finally, monetary trade maximizes the trade surplus since u − e > 2αu from (1) and so it

supports the Pareto eﬃcient allocation.
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To sum up, monetary trade of market goods and non-monetary exchange of home production can both be an equilibrium. They sustain deterministic consumption of diﬀerent
types of goods. The trade patterns coexist because money has extrinsic value in equilibrium, which is a standard result (e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989).5 Monetary trade
is Pareto eﬃcient, as it mirrors the planner’s choice of mandating a transfer of a market
good from each young to each old. This pattern of exchange is beneficial in two ways;
it maximizes the number of matches and it maximizes the surplus in each match, since,
u − e > 2αu. Note that although a young agent would weakly prefer home production to

monetary trade, since vc ≥ vs , no young agent deviates along the monetary equilibrium

path as he realizes he would otherwise be unable to consume when old.

In a nutshell, this is a decentralized trading environment where society can benefit
from specialization and trade: the young should specialize in market production and the
old should consume it. A crucial question is whether there are non-monetary patterns of
exchange that can sustain the eﬃcient allocation. We answer it in the following
Lemma 2. If
N ≥N

≡

2β(u−βe)
(u+e)(1−β 2 )

+

u−e
u+e

then the eﬃcient allocation cannot be sustained without money.
Proof. Suppose there exists a ‘gift-giving’ equilibrium that replicates the eﬃcient allocation. By this we mean an equilibrium where matching and transfers of market goods
is not conditional on money holdings and money transfers. In this case the equilibrium
strategies are as in (4) but they are independent of m and m . That is, for any m and m
and all t we have ω z (t) = ω z and xz (t, m ) = xz where
+
(b, s, m) if z = (m, 1)
ωz =
(s, b, m) if z = (m, 0)
xz =

+

(0, 1, −1)

(0, −1, 1)

if z = (1, 1)
if z = (0, 0).

In short, a young transfers (sells) a market good to anyone who asks for it, while the old
demands (buys) a market good from anyone who is willing to supply it.
Due to anonymity, matching and transfers cannot be based on the partner’s age,
productivity or trade history. The key deviation, therefore, is for a young to go on
the market asking for a transfer, instead of making one in t, reverting to equilibrium
5

There is always an equilibrium with autarky, where everyone chooses to not match with anyone else.
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(consuming) when old, in t + 1. This deviation implies in t there are N + 1 buyers and
N − 1 sellers, out of equilibrium. As a consequence, the deviator knows that in t he can

either remain unmatched or match to a seller. Specifically:
1. With probability

2
N+1

the young deviator remains unmatched, in which case we

denote the deviant’s payoﬀ by βv̂b , the discounted value of trading in t + 1 as an old
buyer, out-of-equilibrium. To determine v̂b , notice that due to the deviation some
old agent does not consume in t. The deviation is undetected since this agent and
his dynasty leave the economy and the number of traders is unobservable. Hence, in
t + 1 there are N − 1 young sellers and N old buyers. Again, some old agent cannot

consume. In particular, the old deviator consumes with probability

N −1
N .

Hence,

t + 2 starts with an equal number of old buyers and young sellers, N − 1. These

agents follow equilibrium play as no deviation is made public. Thus:
v̂b =
2. With probability

N −1
N +1

N −1
N (u + βvs )

=

N−1
N vb

the deviator matches to a seller. Here two old agents do not

consume and their dynasties leave the economy. The deviator’s payoﬀ is u + βv̌b
where v̌b denotes the expected payoﬀ, as an old buyer, out-of-equilibrium in t + 1.
The initial deviation remains undetected. In t + 1 there are N − 2 young who sell
and N old who buy. Hence, two old agents do not consume in t + 1 and two more

dynasties exit the economy. Clearly, this can happen to the deviator in t + 1, since
he is old and consumes only with probability

N−2
N .

It follows that in t + 2 there are

N − 2 young sellers and N − 2 old buyers, so
v̌b =

N−2
N (u + βvs )

=

N−2
N vb .

Thus, in t the young agent’s expected payoﬀ from deviating (buying instead of selling
a market good) is:
v̂s =

N−1
N−2
2
N−1
N+1 (u + β N vb ) + N+1 β N vb .

The deviation is optimal if vs < v̂s ⇒ vs <
N >N ≡
Notice

∂N
∂e

< 0,

∂N
∂β

N−1
N+1 (u + βvb ),

2β(u−βe)
(u+e)(1−β 2 )

+

> 0, limβ→1 N = ∞ > limβ→0 N =

or

u−e
u+e .
u−e
u+e .

The intuition is simple. Suppose agents intend to alternate market production when
young to consumption when old. The problem is that agents are anonymous so matching
9

and trade cannot depend on age, productivity, trade histories or other individual characteristics. A young agent may thus have incentives to misrepresent his needs, by claiming a
market good instead of oﬀering it. Whether or not this deviator gets to consume in t, his
action deters consumption of at least one old agent, whose dynasty leaves the economy.
This has an upside but also a downside for the deviator.
The upside is that the deviation cannot be made public, since the one who observes
it is old and leaves the economy. Thus, since the number of traders is unobservable, no
punishment can be triggered. The downside is represented by the permanent change in
a crucial aggregate state variable–available production opportunities–as the deviation
leads to a reduction in the size of new generations. Due to the matching process, this
creates excess demand for market goods in the period following the deviation, which
spawns consumption risk. The deviator’s assessment of this risk factor hinges on the
size of the trading pool and on time-preferences. In particular, this risk is small if the
initial population is large. Hence, there exists values N ≥ N such that a young prefers to

demand a market good instead of supplying it. Naturally, greater production costs or a
lower discount factor tend to raise the incentive to deviate, so N falls.
Selling for money is an obvious remedy to these incentive problems. It helps allocating

consumption to the initial old while giving the young a verifiable trade record that can be
repeatedly passed on to future generations. Hence, we say that in a large market money
has a fundamental role. The natural question is whether this is true when agents face a
finite sequence of trading rounds, which is what we explore next.
3.2 Trading with Perishable Money
Let H = T − 1 < J = ∞ an odd number, without loss in generality. That is, the

money ‘vanishes’ at the end of T − 1 although the economy continues on.

Conjecture an equilibrium where monetary trade takes place until T − 1, while home

production occurs from T on. This is a combination of the two patterns of trade seen
earlier; consumption is still deterministic, although in T agents switch to a less rewarding
trade pattern. As market goods are only sold for money, we still call this a monetary
equilibrium (slightly abusing the language). Formally, the strategies satisfy
+
ω ∗z
if t < T
ω z (t) =
∗∗
ωz
if t ≥ T
xz (t, m ) =

+

x∗z (m
x∗∗
10

)

if t < T
if t ≥ T.

(6)

Let Vs (t) denote the equilibrium lifetime utility of a young agent (a seller) and Vb (t)
for an old agent (a buyer), in t. Once again, due to altruistic motives, we define
+
−e + βVb (t + 1) t < T
Vs (t) =
vc
t≥T
Vb (t) =

+

u + βVs (t + 1)

t<T

vc

t ≥ T.

(7)

Since T is an even number, a young seller in t = 0 expects his dynasty to accomplish
T /2 monetary trade cycles, selling and buying a market good. Each cycle gives surplus
−e + βu. In period T his descendant is an old buyer. Thus
Vs (0) = (−e + βu) + β 2 (−e + βu) + ... + β T −2 (−e + βu) + β T vc .
Similar considerations can be made for a buyer, implying that in equilibrium
Vb (t) =

1−β T −t
(u − βe) + β T −t vc
1−β 2

Vs (t) =

1−β T −t
(−e
1−β 2

(8)

+ βu) + β T −t vc .

Clearly, Vb (t) > Vs (t) and, from (1), we have
Vb (t) − Vb (t − 1) < 0 < Vs (t) − Vs (t − 1) if t < T.
Also, since vc ≥ vs then

vs ≤ Vs (t) ≤ vc < Vb (t) < vb .

In short, the allocation is ineﬃcient because the exchange of market production is sustained on a subset of the economy’s life-span. Indeed, a buyer has a lower continuation
value–relative to the case H = ∞–because his descendants will eventually switch to less
desirable home production. The opposite holds for a seller since αu(1 + β) ≥ −e + βu.

The crucial feature of this conjectured equilibrium is that a young who sells in T − 1

knows that he will enter period T without money. From then on he and everyone else

will engage in home production. Selling in T − 1, therefore, amounts to making a gift of

market consumption to someone that will never be met again. Of course, this must be in
the seller’s best interest. Indeed, this course of action is individually optimal if it satisfies

individual rationality and incentive compatibility requirements.
To start, participation in trade must be individually rational. That is, everyone must
weakly prefer trade to autarky, at the beginning of a period. Clearly ω z (t) = 0 for all t if
11

Vb (t) ≥ 0 and Vs (t) ≥ 0, which are satisfied by (8). The reason is that every trader expects

to earn some surplus, in the conjectured equilibrium. In addition, a trader’s actions must
be incentive compatible. This amounts to verifying that the agent does not strictly prefer
a diﬀerent matching choice or a diﬀerent trading outcome, than what prescribed by the
equilibrium. We have the following
Lemma 3. Conjecture an equilibrium based on the strategies (6). If
N ≤ N̄ ≡

βαu
e(1−β) ,

then the strategies in (6) are individually optimal.
Proof. Conjecture an equilibrium with strategies given by (6). Lemma 1 insures that
these strategies are individually optimal in t ≥ T . Now consider t < T. Clearly, in
equilibrium an old agent strictly prefers to buy a market good with his money since any
deviation prevents consumption and so generates zero continuation payoﬀ (the agent and
his dynasty leave the economy). Thus, focus on a young in t < T.
This agent has no interest in deviating by trying to match to a seller as the deviator
would end up unmatched. The reason is that in equilibrium sellers are young agents who
desire to match only with someone who has money, i.e., ω (0,0) (t) = (s, b, 1) in t < T .
Choosing to sell to a buyer is at least weakly preferred, in equilibrium, since the agent can
refuse to trade at any stage. Thus, focus on a seller-buyer equilibrium match (young-old
match).
Since exchange must be voluntary, the key deviation here is the young agent refuses
to sell for money. Denote by V̂s (t) the seller’s expected payoﬀ from doing so. Hence,
trade is incentive compatible if Vs (t) ≥ V̂s (t) for all t < T. Clearly, in equilibrium we have

Vs (t) ≥ V̂s (t) = 0 for all t ≤ T − 2 because a young who does not sell cannot obtain

money hence cannot consume when old. This deviation gives zero payoﬀ and so selling is
incentive compatible in t ≤ T − 2, i.e. we have x(0,0) (1) = (0, −1, −1) in t ≤ T − 2.

Now focus on period T −1. Here a seller has a greater incentive to not produce a market

good, since money exhausts its record-keeping role, in this period. Home production, from
T on, is independent of money holdings. Hence, V̂s (T − 1) = βv̂c where
v̂c =

N −1
N (αu + βvc )

is the lifetime utility of the deviator who, as an old agent, attempts to engage in home
production in T . Following the same logic of prior proofs, the deviation lowers by one the
number of young in T (an old does not consume in T − 1). This deviation is undetected so
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there are N − 1 young sellers and N old buyers in T. Once again, one old will not match

and consume so in T + 1 there are N − 1 young sellers and N − 1 old buyers.

Incentive compatibility in T − 1, therefore, requires x(0,0) (T − 1, 1) = x∗(0,0) , i.e.,
−e + βvc ≥ βv̂c ⇒ β(vc − v̂c ) ≥ e.

This can be rearranged as
N ≤ N̄ ≡
Thus,

∂ N̄
∂e

< 0,

∂ N̄
∂β

βαu
e(1−β) .

> 0, limβ→1 N̄ = lime→0 N̄ = ∞ and limβ→0 N̄ = 0.

The intuition is this. By Lemma 1, the strategies listed in (6) are individually optimal
in all t ≥ T. Hence, we need to check for deviations only in t < T . In those periods,

old agents would not deviate because their continuation payoﬀ is positive only if they
consume. Due to the equilibrium matching scheme, this requires that the old follow the
proposed strategy. Young agents want to sell in t < T − 1 since in equilibrium they
cannot engage in home production and they cannot buy (having no money). The key

period, therefore, is T − 1 when money exhausts its record-keeping role. Here, swapping
a market good for money amounts to making a unilateral transfer since the seller receives

no current or future reward. Note that due to anonymity and lack of communication there
is no threat of individual or collective punishment either. So why should a young agent
sell for money in T − 1?

There are two contrasting elements that aﬀect a seller’s incentive to do so. The positive

aspect is that by refusing to sell the young agent can sidestep current disutility −e. Note

that the failure to acquire money is irrelevant here, since money eﬀectively cannot be
carried into the next period. The negative aspect is that the deviation reduces the future
number of productive agents, spawning consumption risk. The relative strength of these
contrasting eﬀects hinges on market size, production disutility and impatience.
In a market populated by many impatient traders, a small reduction in the aggregate production capabilities generates small consumption risk and consequently a small
expected loss, in present value. The opposite is true in a small market which is why the
proposed actions are individually optimal only if N ≤ N̄ . Naturally, this upper bound

grows with greater patience and smaller production costs, as these factors strengthen the
incentives to play equilibrium. This and the prior results lead to the following

Proposition 4. Let H < J = ∞. If β > β̄ ∈ (0, 1) then there exist N ∈ (N , N̄ ) ⊂ (1, ∞)
such that the monetary trade pattern supported by the strategies (6) is an equilibrium. The
corresponding allocation improves on any other possible non-monetary allocation.
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Proof. We start by proving the second part of the proposition. By Lemma 2 we know that
trade of market goods cannot be sustained without the exchange of money, if N > N . The
allocation associated to (6) is even harder to sustain without money as the continuation
payoﬀs in T − 1 are even lower than when J = ∞.

To prove the first part of the proposition recall Lemma 3, indicating the individual

optimality of (6) when N ≤ N̄ . Thus, we need only provide a condition guaranteeing that

[N̄ , N ] is a non-empty set. To do so recall that N̄ and N both increase in β and diverge


to ∞ as β → 1. Also, limβ→0 N̄ − N < 0 while limβ→1 (N − N ) > 0 since


2(u−βe)
β
αu
u−e
N − N = 1−β
−
e
(u+e)(1+β) − u+e
where

αu
e

>

2(u−βe)
(u+e)(1+β)

from (1). Since N and N are continuous in β then, by the

intermediate value theorem, there exists a β ∈ (0, 1) satisfying N = N̄ . This β is unique

since

∂(N−N )
∂β

> 0 always. Hence, there exists β > β̄ such that N̄ > N ≥ 1 so that we can

pick N ∈ (N , N̄ ).

The central lesson is that the incentives for monetary trade in the early life of the
economy hinge on the value generated by switching to a diﬀerent trade pattern, later on.
A seller’s deviation in T − 1 lowers permanently society’s productive capabilities, creating
consumption risk that lowers the deviator’s continuation payoﬀ. In a market of moderate

size with patient agents this aggregate eﬀect is suﬃciently noxious that it disciplines the
seller’s actions. This occurs despite the lack of commitment, enforcement or the possibility
to rely on punishment triggered by publicly announced deviations.
What about small or large economies? In a small economy, it is easy to sustain an
equilibrium where the young make a transfer to the old. Any deviation would be very
costly as it would severely disrupt the process of exchange, so money does not have a
fundamental allocative role. Conversely, in a large economy a deviation would induce
small consumption risk so every young would deviate in T − 1. A standard backward
induction argument suggests money would lose value.

It is important to recognize that money need not change hands in T − 1 (unlike prior

dates) because it loses its record-keeping role after that date. However, money remains a
fundamental element of the trading mechanism because it is crucial that the old consume.
Due to anonymity, the young have an incentive to pass themselves as buyers (see Lemma
1) so that it is optimal to match and trade only with someone who has money.
Figure 1 reports the results of a numerical simulation of a sequence of infinitelylived economies characterized by diﬀerent initial populations and preferences for future
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consumption.6 The area above the curve N sustains the monetary equilibrium defined by
(4), when H = ∞. For economies where H < ∞, instead, (6) is an equilibrium only in
the shaded area. As we see in this second case the parameter set supporting monetary

trade is smaller due to the earlier recognized trade-oﬀ between market size and patience.
Indeed, as β increases, monetary trade can be sustained for larger values of N since greater
patience gives more weight to the harm resulting from a young agent’s defection in T − 1.

3.3 Trading in a Finite Horizon
We now show that monetary trade can take place even if the economy has a finite
life. Indeed, this amounts to showing that society can benefit from the adoption of a
record-keeping technology. To do so, we set 1 ≤ J < ∞. Since no one would produce for
a token in period J, we construct an equilibrium with a simple ‘regime switch’ occurring

at some date H < J when tokens lose value. Here, the agents engage in monetary trade
until H and engage in non-monetary home joint production, afterward.
We let H = T − 1, for continuity with earlier notation, where 1 ≤ T ≤ J. In equilib-

rium, this pattern of transactions is characterized by strategies that are time-invariant in
the sub-intervals [0, T − 1] and [T, J]. Formally, we have
+
ω ∗z
if t < T
ω z (t) =
∗∗
if T ≤ t ≤ J
ωz
xz (t, m ) =
6

+

x∗z (m
x∗∗

)

if t < T
if T ≤ t ≤ J.

Here u = 10, e = 0.99, α = 0.45. This ensures that (1) is satisfied.
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(9)

This pattern of exchange mirrors (6) with the key diﬀerence that after T −1 agents engage

in home production for J − T + 1 < ∞ periods. Then the economy ends.

Conjecturing an equilibrium according to (9), the recursive formulation of expected

lifetime utilities in (7) must be amended. Precisely, in what follows we work with
+
−e + βVb (t + 1) t < T
Vs (t) =
T ≤t≤J
vc (J − t + 1)
Vb (t) =

+

u + βVs (t + 1)

t<T

vc (J − t + 1)

T ≤t≤J

(10)

where for t = T, ..., J we define



1 − β J−t+1 αu 
= 1 − β J−t+1 vc .
vc (J − t + 1) =
1−β

(11)

Note that the continuation payoﬀ at date t = T , i.e., vc (J − T + 1), now depends on

the number J − T + 1 of trade rounds that separate the end of monetary trade from the

economy’s terminal date. A first implication of having a terminal date, therefore, is that
continuation payoﬀs are uniformly smaller than when J = ∞. Precisely
Vb (t) =

1−β T −t
(u − βe) + β T −t vc (J
1−β 2

Vs (t) =

1−β T −t
(−e + βu) + β T −t vc (J
1−β 2

− T + 1)
− T + 1)

where vc (J − t + 1) < vc < vs < vb . As we move to an infinite horizon economy, J → ∞,
then vc (J − t + 1) → vc . Also, using l’Hospital rule limβ→1

1−β J−T +1
1−β

limβ→1 vc (J − t + 1) = (J − T + 1)αu. Clearly in all t we have

= J − T + 1, thus

Vb (t)|J=∞ > Vb (t)|J<∞ > Vs (t)|J<∞ ≥ 0,
so participation in trade is individually rational at all dates, i.e., ω z (t) = 0 for all t. This
also means that the value of money in this economy is smaller than in an infinite-life
economy. Also for t < T we have
Vb (t) − Vb (t − 1) < 0 ≤ Vs (t) − Vs (t − 1)
since (1) implies Vs (t) < vs ≤ vc < vb .

To find parameters under which the actions described in (9) are individually optimal

we follow the same procedure as before, resulting in
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Lemma 5. Conjecture an equilibrium based on the strategies (9). There exist (J, T ) pairs
satisfying 1 ≤ T ≤ J < ∞ with a corresponding value
=

N=

βαu(1−β J−T +1 )
,
e(1−β)

=

such that if N ≤N , then the strategies in (9) are individually optimal.
Proof. Suppose the equilibrium strategies are as in (9) for some 1 ≤ T ≤ J < ∞. Clearly,

the arguments concerning periods t < T − 1 that we laid out in Lemma 3 apply also here.
The only item we have to revisit is the deviation of the matched seller in period T − 1,
since the continuation payoﬀs are diﬀerent due to J being finite.

Thus, consider t = T − 1. Suppose the young agent refuses to sell to a buyer and

denote the deviant’s discounted continuation payoﬀ by βv̂c (J − t + 1) where, following the
same logic as before, we have

v̂c (J − T + 1) =

N −1
[αu + βvc (J − T )].
N

Selling is incentive compatible if −e + βvc (J − T + 1) ≥ βv̂c (J − T + 1) rearranged as
αu
N−1
1−β (1 − N β

−

1 J−T +1
)
Nβ

≥

N−1
e
N αu + β .

(12)

Thus, (12) holds for
=

N ≤N ≡
=

It is clear that

∂N
∂β

βαu(1−β J−T +1 )
e(1−β)

=

= N̄ (1 − β J−T +1 ).
=

∂N
> 0, ∂(J−T
) > 0, limβ→1 N =

αu(J−T +1)
e
=

=

and limJ−T →∞ N = N̄ . It

follows that there exists (J, T ) pairs and values N ≤N such that (12) holds and hence (9)
is individually optimal.
This result is virtually identical to Lemma 3. The main diﬀerence is the presence of the
term J − T , which must be suﬃciently large. Indeed, a young producer will choose to not

misrepresent his consumption needs in T −1 only if he has a suﬃciently large continuation

payoﬀ. This requires a suﬃciently long string of home consumption, i.e. J − T must be

suﬃciently large. The key implication is that even when the trading horizon is finite and
publicly known, tokens may have a beneficial role for society.
=

Proposition 6. There are (J, T ) pairs, 1 ≤ T ≤ J < ∞, such that if β >β∈ (0, 1) then
=

there exist values N ∈ (N , N ) ⊂ (1, ∞) such that the monetary trade pattern supported by
=

the strategies (9) is an equilibrium. The corresponding allocation improves on any other
possible non-monetary allocation.
17

Proof. Conjecture (9) is an equilibrium. Lemma 5 tells us that (9) is individually optimal
=

when N ≤N . To prove that the allocation improves over a non-monetary allocation we
cannot use Lemma 2, since J < ∞. Thus, we simply have to prove that, in the absence
of money, on date T − 1 a young would prefer to misrepresent his needs by choosing to
trade claiming consumption instead of oﬀering it.

By an argument identical to the one presented in the proof of Lemma 2, the expected
payoﬀ to a young deviator in T − 1 is denoted
v̂s =

N −1
2
[u + βv̌c (J − T + 1)] +
βv̂c (J − T + 1).
N +1
N +1

The deviator consumes with probability

N−1
N+1 ,

(13)

does nothing otherwise and

v̌c (J − T + 1) =

N−2
N [αu + βvc (J

− T )]

v̂c (J − T + 1) =

N−1
N [αu + βvc (J

− T )]

(14)

are the deviator’s (undiscounted) continuation values from entering period T with or
without consuming in T − 1. Using (11) in (14) we can rearrange (13) as
v̂s =

N−1
N+1 [u + βvc (J

− T + 1)].

The deviation is optimal if −e + βvc (J − T + 1) < v̂s , rearranged as
2βαu(1−β J−T +1 )
(u+e)(1−β)

N >N ≡
=

Notice

∂N
=

∂e
=

< 0 <

∂N
=

∂β

, limβ→0 N =
=
=

u−e
u+e

+

u−e
u+e

< N.

and limβ→1 N =
=

2(J−T +1)+u−e
.
u+e

Therefore,

limβ→0 (N − N ) < 0 while limβ→1 (N − N ) > 0 since
=

=

=

N − N=
=

β (1−β J−T +1 ) αu
(e
1−β

−

2αu
u−e
u+e ) − u+e

=

and u + e > 2αu (from (1)). Since N and N are continuous in β then, by the intermediate
=

=

=

=

=

value theorem, there exists a β∈ (0, 1) satisfying N =N . This β is unique since
=

=

∂ (N −N )
=

∂β

>0

=

always. Also, limJ−T →∞ N = N̄ . Thus, there exists β >β and J − T suﬃciently large
=
=
such that N >N > 1 so that we can pick N ∈ (N , N ).
=

=

In short, even in a finite horizon economy, society might have reasons to exploit the
availability of fiat money. This occurs early on in the life of the economy and only if there
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are alternative non-monetary allocations that–although generating smaller returns from
trade–can be supported in a finitely repeated game without commitment, enforcement or
recall. In our model, this is possible because young-old pairs can costlessly (and jointly)
produce low-value home goods. Of course, since monetary exchange can only take place
on an initial set of periods, the unilateral transfers made in T −1 must be compensated by

a suﬃciently long spell of this less valuable consumption, in the remaining periods. Hence,
as the life of the economy shrinks, so does the duration of initial monetary exchange. This
explains why if β is too low, then money cannot be valued.

Figure 2 illustrates this result. It simulates two ‘types’ of economies, longer- and
shorter-lived. In one we have J − T + 1 = 100 and in the other we set it to 1. The
=

index on the curves N and N reflects this distinction. As indicated earlier, we see that
=
monetary exchange can be sustained in economies with larger markets and with lower

discount factors the larger is the continuation value to a seller in date T − 1, i.e., the

greater is J − T . The figure also indicates that we can find β and N values that sustain

monetary exchange in both short- and longer-lived economies (the dark area created by
the intersection of the curves N
=

=

100

and N 1 ).

4 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed an anonymous trading environment where agents cannot commit to
future actions, enforce transfers or base actions on histories of play. We have proved that,
despite the presence of a publicly known finite trading horizon, society can expand the
set of allocations through monetary exchange. First, we have presented an infinitely-lived
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economy in which monetary exchange supports a better allocation on a subset of the
economy’s life. Then, we have illustrated how this can happen even if the economy has a
finite and deterministic life-span.
These findings have been substantiated by means of simple, albeit rigorous, theoretical
examples that suggest the following insights. First, the presence of a known finite trading horizon is generally insuﬃcient to prevent society from exploiting some of the gains
associated with specialization and monetary exchange. Second, in environments where
individual actions can significantly aﬀect some aggregate state variable, an individual will
voluntarily take an action that reduces his current payoﬀ if this prevents others from
making choices that carry adverse long-lasting aggregate consequences. This is despite
the lack of enforcement, commitment or the threat of punishment.
These basic insights should be robust to alternative specifications meant to enrich our
model’s more ‘stylized’ design features. For example, one can think of other reasons why
an incorrect allocation of consumption can have noxious aggregate eﬀects, an insuﬃcient
accumulation of human or physical capital being one such reason. Indeed, we surmise that
the basic lessons of this paper should emerge in any framework where individual actions
have a non-negligible strategic impact or can carry long-lasting aggregate consequences.
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